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Editorial
On October 12-13, 2006 the National Bank of Belgium hosted a Conference on "Price and Wage
Rigidities in an Open Economy". Papers presented at this conference are made available to a
broader audience in the NBB Working Paper Series (www.nbb.be).
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the National Bank of Belgium.
Abstract
In this paper we derive a microfounded macro New Keynesian model for open economies, be them
large or small. We consider habit formation in consumption, sectoral linkages, domestic and foreign
governments, tradable and non-tradable final and intermediate goods and imperfect pass-through in
these sectors. Sticky nominal prices and wages are modeled in a Calvo way. The model economy
is composed of a continuum of infinitely-lived consumers and producers for three regions
(countries). Numerical simulations and econometric estimations are presented with a focus on a
small open economy member of the EMU. Welfare implications of the involved price and wage
rigidities are discussed.
JEL-code :  E31, D21, F41, P24.
Keywords:  New Keynesian open economy model, tradable and non-tradable sectors, final and
intermediate goods, monetary policy rules, numerical simulations, Bayesian estimation,
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During the recent years the theoretical and empirical research in New Keynesian (NK) macroeco-
nomics has been extended steadily and produced a whole new series of results and insights about
the workings of the macroeconomy. Essential starting point of the NK approach is the explicit
derivation of macroeconomic relationships from underlying microeconomic foundations. This prin-
ciple is shared with New Classical macroeconomics, although the former includes a great deal of
imperfections in the goods and labor markets.
Recently, much interest has also been devoted to modeling and testing e⁄ects and interactions
produced by the foreign sector, e.g. rigidities of import and export pricing that might be of
signi￿cant importance in an open economy. Moreover, ￿ uctuations in import prices of intermediate
goods such as oil and steel will have strong e⁄ects on domestic ￿rms of an open economy. In
that perspective, the exchange rate will play an important role in the transmission of such price
￿ uctuations to the domestic economy. NK models with a worked out foreign sector are often
referred to as New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) models.
This paper studies numerical simulations, econometric estimations and welfare impli-
cations of monetary policies taking account of nominal price and wage rigidities both on
a small open economy being a member of a monetary union (MU), on the rest of that monetary
union (RoMU) and on the rest of the world (RoW).
More speci￿cally, we extend the NOEM model of Plasmans et al. (2006a), characterized by a
detailed modeling of the consumer and producer decisions, to a three country setting. In particular,
￿rms in our model produce two types of goods: ￿nal and intermediate. Both types of goods can
be either tradable or non-tradable, depending on whether they can be traded internationally.
Firms in every sector are assumed to be characterized by nested CES production functions whose
arguments are technology, labor force and intermediate goods.1 Each ￿rm is assumed to have
some price-setting power on relevant markets, re￿ ecting monopolistic competition. Consumers are
assumed to purchase a bundle of domestically produced tradable and non-tradable ￿nal goods
and imported ￿nal goods. Consumption allocation is assumed to be shaped by habit formation.
Labor markets with sticky wages and ￿nancial markets complete the structure of the model of
the domestic (small open) economy. Altogether, we distinguish 12 (￿nal and intermediate goods)
markets with which domestic ￿rms are confronted. Foreign economies are modeled in a parallel
manner so that import/export prices and quantities and other relevant variables are endogenized
in our approach.
Such an extensive modeling of intermediate goods sectors is important especially in the context
of exchange rate policies. Dellas (2005) points out that the presence of intermediate goods has
vital consequences for the ability of monetary authorities to manipulate nominal exchange rates.
When there is no production interdependence between countries (i.e. only consumption goods are
traded) changes in a nominal exchange rate do not a⁄ect production costs. However, when there is
trade in intermediate goods as in the real world, an exchange rate depreciation has adverse direct
e⁄ects on the cost of domestic production. Consequently, it makes the exchange rate instrument
less useful.2
As an application, we consider the case of The Netherlands (NL) as a member of the European
Monetary Union (EMU), the latter being considered as the ￿rst large economy. Our choice is
1It is assumed that intermediate goods producers do not use other intermediate goods as their inputs.
2The relevance of intermediate goods in the production processes is nicely illustrated by annual Input-output
tables of (for instance) the Dutch economy, where they account for around 25% of all inputs in many industries.
See Data Appendix F for details.
1driven by the availability of time series data of intermediate goods inputs and prices and also by
the fact that NL has strong economic relationships with the RoW (second large economy, proxied
by the USA). In this setting we compare possible European Central Bank (ECB) policies under
the form of di⁄erent speci￿cations of a Taylor rule.
Numerical simulations and econometric estimations (e.g. Bayesian methods) will be analyzed
to study the impact of shocks in such a three-country setting. More in detail, we study the impulse
response functions (IRFs) to the following shocks: common and asymmetric positive technological
shocks in the tradable (non-tradable) ￿nal goods sectors in di⁄erent economies, an exchange rate
shock, a monetary policy shock and a taste shock to consumption.
2 A literature review
There are not many papers that consider a NOEM setting with an MU. Pytlarczyk (2005) de-
velops a two-region dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the euro area with
a particular focus on analyzing the German economy within the EMU. The interesting elements
of his work are (i) the utilization of disaggregated information in the estimation, i.e. national
accounts data, along with the "synthetic" euro area data; (ii) the utilization of regime-switching
models in a DSGE framework, which allows to use a longer data sample (prior to and during the
EMU). He applies Bayesian techniques in estimation and explicitly takes account of the change in
the monetary regime in the EMU.
Pierdzioch (2004) uses a two-country NOEM model of a monetary union to analyze the con-
sequences of international ￿nancial market integration for the propagation of asymmetric produc-
tivity shocks. His model implies that business cycle volatility is higher the more integrated the
capital markets of the member countries of the MU are.
In this MU setting we could study, for instance, the issue of welfare implications of monetary
policies for a small open economy, which is a member of the MU, both considering di⁄erent
levels of price and wage rigidities between the small open economy and the RoMU. The most
interesting reference for us is Ortega and Rebei (2006), since they treat the welfare implications
in a multisectoral two-country setting. Following their spirit we characterize simple Taylor-type
monetary policy reaction functions.
The welfare costs of nominal inertia are directly related to the welfare costs of business cycle
￿ uctuations which have been at the center of macroeconomic research since the seminal paper
by Lucas (1987). Lucas (2003) focused on the variability of consumption and has argued that
the costs of these ￿ uctuations are very small, roughly 0.07 percent of steady state consumption.
His conclusion is that macroeconomists should set their research priorities on improving economic
growth rather than on ￿ne-tuning of the cycle. Recently, Gal￿ et al. (2003) have built a measure
of the costs of business cycle ￿ uctuations centering around the gap between the marginal product
of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, the so-called
￿e¢ ciency gap￿ . They calibrate a small number of parameters and take that measure to US data.
Gal￿ et al. (2003) show that the average welfare costs of business cycle ￿ uctuations could very
well be higher than what Lucas (2003) computes. Costs in the benchmark calibration of Gal￿ et
al. (2003) are 0:28 percent of steady state consumption and range up to 0.75 per cent. Variations
in the e¢ ciency gap arise endogenously in models with wage and price stickiness such as in the
seminal work by Erceg et al. (2000). As pointed out by Gal￿ et al. (2003), there are however a
number of other frictions that could also contribute to the variance of this gap. Canzoneri et al.
(2005) follow this discussion and calculate the welfare cost of nominal inertia in a New Neoclassical
2Synthesis model with wage and price stickiness, capital formation, and empirically estimated rules
for government spending and the central bank￿ s interest rate policy. Their model is calibrated to
US data and the cost of nominal inertia is calculated under two speci￿cations of monetary policy.
Paustian (2004) considers the share of nominal rigidities in wages and prices in the average
welfare costs of business cycle ￿ uctuations. He computes a quadratic approximation to agents￿
expected lifetime utility and evaluate welfare for di⁄erent modeling schemes of nominal rigidities.
His results indicate that the welfare loss depends on the way of modeling the stickiness, even with
the same average duration of contracts. Calvo (1983) contracts can imply welfare costs that are
up to 4 times higher than those implied by overlapping contracts in the spirit of Taylor (1980) or
Wolman (1999). Furthermore, the sticky information framework of Mankiw and Reis (2002) may
generate welfare costs that are smaller.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we model both domestic and foreign households.
The households￿decisions feature habit formation in consumption of tradable and non-tradable
goods. Section 4 introduces domestic and foreign governments. In Section 5 we study the ￿rms￿
decisions considering supply linkages in production by distinguishing intermediate goods from ￿nal
goods and tradable from non￿ tradable goods. Equilibrium conditions are proposed in Section 6,
while a discussion on net foreign assets follows in Section 7. Regarding price formation we consider
the cases of price stickiness with Calvo-type staggered price and wage settings in Section 8. In
Section 9, we discuss the institutional setup of the monetary policy both in the MU and the RoW.
Section 10 concentrates on welfare maximizing monetary policy rules utilizing a second order
approximation. Some numerical simulations demonstrating the functioning of the model will be
discussed in Section 11, while econometric estimations are reported in Section 12. Finally, some
concluding remarks are contained in Section 13.
3 Households
3.1 Domestic households
In the model to be constructed the following notation is used: the country of origin is always de-
noted as a subscript, whereas the country of destination (consumption) is denoted as a superscript.
In this paper, h stands for the home country (the small open economy) being a member of the
MU, U stands for the RoMU (￿rst foreign country) and W stands for the RoW (second foreign
country).
Each household i in home country h is assumed to face a consumer budget constraint (CBC)


































t (i) + Bh;t(i); (1)







h;t(i) is a nominal lump-sum transfer from the government to household i and Bh;t(i) are consumer
i￿ s net bene￿ts from ￿rms￿ownership, where it is assumed that the whole entrepreneurial bene￿ts
accrue to domestic consumers, Mh
t (i) are nominal money balances at the beginning of period t;
Ch
t (i) is total consumption and P
C;h
t (i) is its aggregate price. Moreover, according to Woodford
(2003) and Ambler et al. (2003, 2004), Qh
h;t;t+1 ￿ (1 + rt;t+1)￿1; ^ Qh
U;t;t+1 ￿ (1 + ^ rh
U;t;t+1)￿1 and
3^ Qh
W;t;t+1 ￿ (1 + ^ rh
W;t;t+1)￿1 are for domestic consumers the one-period ahead stochastic discount
factors for (nominal) domestic and foreign asset payo⁄s, respectively.3 Hence, the expected (nom-
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; with St the nominal exchange rate
(the price of one unit of foreign currency in domestic currency) in that period.4
The speci￿cation of CBCs for U and W can be found in Appendix A (see (42) and(43)).
3.2 The domestic household optimization
We specify household i￿ s (from country h) intertemporal utility function as:5
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where ￿h > 0 is a parameter of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) of domestic households
in the home country being equal to the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption, ￿h is the home consumers￿habit persistence parameter and ￿h is the inverse of the





t (i) is household i￿ s real
money balance at the beginning of period t + 1, ￿M;h is a constant and ￿h is the elasticity of
substitution of real money balances in the home country.6
Maximization of the expected discounted sum (2) of household i￿ s utility ￿ ows subject to
its budget constraint (1) and the relevant demand for labor with respect to Ch
t (i), Lm
h;t(i) for
m = FT;FN;V T;V N; Mh
t+1(i), and household i￿ s nominal domestic and foreign asset portfolios




results in the following ￿rst order conditions (FOCs) (see Appendix A in Plasmans et al. (2006a)):
3Alternatively, these stochastic discount factors can also be considered as prices of one (domestic and foreign)
assets paid to the consumer (owner of assets) at time t + 1.
4For an exact de￿nition of e⁄ective interest rates ^ rh
U;t;t+1 and ^ rh
W;t;t+1; see Section 8 in this paper. Notice also
that St is used to translate asset returns at the beginning and at the end of period t so that, de facto, it represents
the average exchange rate during period t; see also equation (20) in Selaive and Tuesta (2003).
5This is a Constant Rate of Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function that allows for habit formation as in Kozicki
and Tinsley (2002). Moreover, notice that following the international literature, we assume that the parameters in
this utility function are equal over consumers.
6Recent micro-level studies report mixed evidence of the impact of habit formation in consumption (see Ravina
(2005)), while studies conducted with aggregate data ￿nds substantial evidence, e.g. Christiano et al.(2005),
enphasize the role of habit persistence in the explanation of the hump-shaped behavior of aggregate consumption
in response to a monetary policy shock. Notice that habit formation in consumption vanishes and consumption is
as the usual CRRA ulitily if ￿h = 0:


































































































where the Lagrange multiplier ￿h
t(i) of the budget constraint is the marginal utility of household i￿ s
wealth and %Lm;h is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for di⁄erent types of labor demanded
by ￿rms in sector m = FT;FN;V T;V N and which should be larger than one. Equation (3) implies
that the marginal utility of a particular household￿ s consumption good equals the marginal utility
of its wealth. Equations (4) relate the household i￿ s marginal utility of leisure to its marginal
utility of the nominal wage in every sector. Equations (5), (6) and (7) refer to the household
i￿ s intertemporal decision involving decisions on home and foreign ￿nancial assets and (8) is the
optimal real money balances demand.
Each foreign consumer in countries U and W solves a similar problem as presented above. More
in detail, foreign consumers must satisfy a set of FOCs analogous to (3 - 8) in the optimum, where
￿U
t (i) and ￿W
t (i) are then the marginal utilities of foreign household i￿ s (in country U and in country
W, respectively) nominal consumption and where we can derive foreign stochastic consumption
Euler relationships.
4 Governments














































































h;t(i)di = 0: (9)
Government revenues include personal tax, money creation and domestic and foreign bond
incomes whereas expenditures include nominal lump-sum transfers.
Foreign governments solve a similar problem as the domestic one.
55 Firms
Following Smets and Wouters (2003), Gal￿ and Monacelli (2002), Choi and Jung (2003), Jung
(2004) and LindØ et al. (2004), it is assumed that suppliers of inputs are price setters under pro￿t
maximization and demanders for inputs are price takers under cost minimization. Goods markets
are characterized by monopolistic competition and pro￿t maximization in the output markets. An
alternative interpretation is that the ￿rms￿problem in open economies can be disentangled in two
stages: one for ￿nal goods and one for intermediate goods. The inspiration for an intermediate
goods versus ￿nal goods distinction can be found in Clarida et al. (2002), Smets and Wouters
(2003) and Plasmans et al. (2006a).8 We assume that intermediate and ￿nal goods and tradable
and non-tradable goods are produced in a sectoral framework. Domestic goods are assumed to be
produced in each sector by a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms, indexed by j 2 [0;1],
while imported ￿nal and intermediate goods are bought (at marginal cost) in the foreign market by
importing ￿rms (in import sectors MF and MV ), repacked and sold in the domestic market, also
under monopolistic competition. Hence, ￿rms in the monopolistically competitive import goods
sectors turn the foreign goods, bought at their given world price marginal cost, into di⁄erentiated
￿nal and intermediate import goods.
Each domestic ￿rm j is assumed to produce one di⁄erentiated ￿nal or intermediate good which
can be either tradable or non-tradable. Six main sectors are distinguished: 1. the tradable ￿nal
goods sector (FT); 2. the non-tradable ￿nal goods sector (FN); 3. the tradable intermediate
goods sector (V T); 4. the non-tradable intermediate goods sector (V N). Additionally, we assume
that all tradable goods are imported, repacked or rebranded by import sectors MF and MV for
￿nal and intermediate goods, respectively.
In ￿nal goods production sectors, m = FT;FN; we assume variable returns to scale and a
nested CES production technology with labor, Lm
t (j), and intermediate goods, V m
t (j); as inputs:9
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for j 2 [0;1], where ￿m;h and ￿m;h are the (home country) intertemporal elasticities of substitution
between the ￿nal goods inputs and di⁄erent intermediate goods inputs, respectively. Both must
be larger than one.
In (10-11) ￿Lm;h is the share of labor input in total input, while ￿m1;h; ￿m2;h and ￿m3;h are
the shares of domestically produced tradable and non-tradable intermediate goods and imported
8Non-tradable intermediate goods include intermediate goods which are relatively too expensive to be trans-
ported, e.g. sand, water and various kinds of services.
9Similarly to household i￿ s utility function (2), we assume that in sector m producer j￿ s production function
parameters are the same across producers. We assume that intermediate goods include capital goods. For the
treatment of capital goods as a separate input, see Plasmans et al. (2006a).
6intermediate goods produced in U in total intermediate goods input of that ￿rm in sector m; ￿m
h;t is
a domestic technology shock in period t, which, according to learning characteristics, is assumed to
satisfy an AR(1) process: ln￿m
h;t ￿ !m
h;t = ￿m;!;h!h
m;t￿1 + ￿m;!;h;t with ￿1 < ￿m;!;h < 1 and ￿m;!;h;t
an independently and identically distributed (iid) error term; in addition, $m;h is the returns to
scale parameter in sector m in the home country.10
Intermediate goods ￿rms m = V T;V N use labor according to the production function:
V
m













where $m;h is the returns to scale parameter in the production of intermediate goods in sector m
of the home country.
It is assumed that foreign producers in countries U and W face production functions similar
to (10-12).
6 Equilibrium conditions
Since sectoral ￿rms are able to exert monopolistic power, they are able to charge di⁄erent prices
according to the market they serve. First, domestic producers of tradable ￿nal goods sell their
output at 3 markets: domestic market of home tradable consumption and foreign (wholesale)
markets of home consumption goods. Hence, a tradable ￿nal goods company sells its output
by charging the vector of prices PFT
h;t (j) = PCT









h;t (j) and P
X;CT;W
h;t (j) are export prices of domestic tradable consumption goods. Second,
a domestic producer of non-tradable ￿nal goods sells her products only to domestic consumers
charging a price PFN
h;t (j) ￿ P CN
h;t (j): Third, an intermediate tradable goods company sells its output
to 2 markets (m = FT;FN) in each of the three economies h;U and W; charging the following
set of prices: PV T













h;t (j)]0, where, similarly to the case of ￿nal goods, X denotes exports of domestic tradable
intermediate goods. Fourth, an intermediate non-tradable goods company sells its output to 2
sectors, m = FT;FN, of the home country, or PV N




h;t (j)]0: Finally, a
￿rm in the domestic import sector of ￿nal tradable goods charges P
MF;h

















Moreover, we require market clearing equilibrium conditions for all ￿rms. The demand for
the tradable ￿nal good produced by company j is the sum of domestic and foreign consumption
demands for this good. The demand for the non-tradable ￿nal good is equal to domestic demand
for this good. The demand for the tradable intermediate good is the sum of the domestic and
foreign demands for this good in the ￿nal goods sectors m = FT;FN and the demand for the
non-tradable intermediate good is the sum of the domestic demands for this good in all sectors.



















h;t (j;i)di. Hence, we can








h;t (j)]0: Analogously, DFN
h;t (j) ￿ [CN
h;t(j)]; DV T





10Note that our AR(1) process can be interpreted as highly persistent shock that shifts the trend level of a
productivity growth (see, for instance, Erceg et al. (2005), where productivity shocks are split in two parts: a
highly persistent (which corresponds to !m
h;t) and a transitory ones (which corresponds to a shock as ￿m;!;h;t)).
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h;t (j) represents the (domestic) demand for tradable intermediate goods produced
by company j demanded by ￿rms in sector m in the home country.
Consequently, the equilibrium or market clearing conditions can be written as (see also Na-









































where ￿m is the unity vector containing an appropriate number of ones being equal to the number of
markets in sector m. Furthermore, we disaggregate the total output of company j in every domestic
sector as YFT






h;t (j)]0; and, analogously, Y FN
h;t (j) ￿ [Y CN




















h;t (j)]0: At equilibrium we assume that YFT
h;t (j) = DFT
h;t (j); YFN
h;t (j) = DFN
h;t (j);
YV T
h;t (j) = DV T
h;t (j) and YV N
h;t (j) = DV N
h;t (j):
Analogous equilibrium conditions for the RoMU and the RoW hold.
7 Calvo staggered price and wage setting
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that domestic ￿rms (suppliers) adjust their price(s) infrequently
and that the opportunity to adjust follows an exogenous Poisson process. In each period, there is
a constant probability 1￿’
(j)
nm;h that ￿rm j in sector m in the home country will be able to adjust
its price on its market nm, independently of past history. Hence, the average duration between






nm;h lies between 0 and 1.13
Assuming that there is a continuum of ￿rms, then each ￿rm￿ s probability to adjust its price
is more or less similar so that, if the law of large numbers holds, this implies that the fraction of
￿rms in sector m at market nm not setting prices at t is ’nm;h. Moreover, price signals are drawn
randomly and independently of the time that suppliers were last o⁄ered to adjust their price. In
particular, a fraction 1 ￿ ’nm;h of monopolistically competitive ￿rms in the (domestic) product
markets are assumed to set their own prices in advance by maximizing the present discounted
value of pro￿ts subject to appropriate demand functions, which have to be determined ￿rst.
The newly set vector of domestic prices is derived for every producer j in sector m in the home




























12Some authors assume that producers do not know beforehand whether their goods will be used as a ￿nal good
or as an input in production chain (see for example Leith and Malley (2002)). However, we follow the spirit of the
General Equilibrium models ￿ la Debreu where market clearing is de￿ned for each (sub)market.
13For example, a Calvo price parameter equal to 0.75 implies an average duration of 4 periods.















h;t￿1:(see Erceg et al. (2005)).
8s.t. relevant demand functions where the Calvo-assumption is applied, i.e. the producer assumes
that the price remains constant; for example, taking account of equilibrium conditions in section 6,
the aggregate optimal demand for a domestic consumption tradable good becomes (see Plasmans















In (17) ￿h;t;t+a(j) represents the (nominal) discount factor from t to t + a applied by ￿rm j
to the stream of future pro￿ts and TC
m;h
t+a(j) is the (nominal) total cost of production at period
t + a of ￿rm j in sector m in the home country. Moreover, ￿m is the unity vector containing of
an appropriate number of ones which equals the number of markets and (’m;h)a is a vector of
probabilities of price changes for a producer in sector m in the home country: Elements of this
vector correspond to elements of relevant price vectors PFT
h;t (j); PFN
h;t (j); PV T




h;t (j): For instance, ’FT;h ￿ [’CT;h; ’X;CT;U;h; ’X;CT;W;h]0 and ’V N;h ￿ [’V N;FT;h; ’V N;FN;h]0:
Assuming for simplicity that ￿h;t;t+a(j) = (bh)
a ; we obtain the following optimality condition
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5
; (19)
where i is the number of markets with which the home ￿rm in sector m is confronted.




h;t , is assumed to be determined by a CES aggregator












h;t (j); according to




















where ￿ is a component-wise multiplication operator.
Given the monopolistically competitive structure of the labor market, forward-looking house-
holds set nominal wages in staggered contracts that are analogous to the price contracts described
above. More speci￿cally, wages adjust with in Calvo-type manner with a probability ’W
m;h in every
period t: Hence, in any period in which household i is able to reset its wage contract, it maxi-
mizes utility (2) with respect to wage rates W m
h;t; s.t. the relevant demand for labor and budget
constraint (1) for every production sector m = FT;FN; V T;V N: According to Plasmans et al.






























Since any (domestic) wage at period t, W m
h;t(i), is assumed to be determined by the CES
aggregator of the predetermined wage W m
h;t￿l(i) and the newly set wage, ￿ W m
h;t(i); according to

























8 Net Foreign Assets
In Subsection 3.1 rt;t+1 is the nominal domestic interest rate in the whole MU between t and t+1,
while ^ rh
U;t;t+1 and ^ rh
W;t;t+1 are the interest rates e⁄ectively paid by domestic consumers for both
kinds of foreign assets, which are de￿ned as:




U;t+1(:)(1 + rt;t+1); (23)







for the RoMU and the RoW, respectively. In (23) and (24) the factors of proportionality zh
U;t+1(:)
and zh
W;t+1(:) are functions which, according to Benigno (2001), depend on the real holdings of
the corresponding domestic consumer i￿ s foreign assets; this means that domestic households take
















t+1 (i) are appropriately de￿ned real foreign assets; are subject to the following restrictions:
E [zt+1(0)] = 1 and this function takes the value 1 only if B
￿(R)
t+1 (i) = 0. Moreover zt+1(:) is a
di⁄erentiable, decreasing function in the neighborhood of zero. Benigno (2001, p. 5) argues that
function zt+1(:) can be described in two ways. First, it captures the (intermediation) costs, for
the domestic households of undertaking positions in the international bonds (assets) market. As
borrowers, they will be charged a (risk) premium on the foreign interest rate; as lenders, they
will receive a remuneration lower than the foreign interest rate. Second, an alternative way to
describe this cost is to assume the existence of intermediaries in the foreign bonds (assets) market
(which are owned by the foreign households), who can borrow from and lend to foreign households
at rates 1 + rt;t+1 and 1 + rW
t;t+1, but can borrow from and lend to domestic households at rates
zh
U;t+1(1 + rt;t+1) and zh
W;t+1(1 + rW
t;t+1), respectively.15
There are many functions zt(:) that satisfy the above requirements In the spirit of Ambler


















15The property that in (23) and (24) only the factors of proportionality zh
U;t+1(:) and zh
W;t+1(:) (and not ^ rh
U;t;t+1
and ^ rh
W;t;t+1) are consumer i-dependent is argued from this interpretation.
16For instance, another formulation of zt(:) can be found in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2003) and Malik (2005)
on the one side and in Erceg et al. (2005) on the other side.
10where St￿1B￿
t(i) is consumer i￿ s nominal NFAs position with ￿ S ￿ B￿(i) being her steady-state value of
nominal foreign assets and vt is an iid process centered in a certain parameter value ￿. Therefore,
once we allow either for perfect capital mobility or for NFAs equal to zero, the familiar uncovered
interest rate parity (UIP) hypothesis holds with purely temporary deviations.
Notice that the arbitrage condition is operating for the returns of all NFAs. In particular,
dividing (7) by (5) yields the UIP hypothesis between the home country and the RoW, taking


















(1 + rt;t+1)￿1 :
Log-linearizing with respect to an expected zero depreciation of the exchange rate, we get:










W;t+1(:) is the (logarithmic) risk premium de￿ned in (25).
The methodology to state the arbitrage condition between the RoMU and the RoW is the same















we can log-linearize again around the zero expected exchange depreciation rate to obtain:















"A kind of UIP condition" between the home country and the RoMU can be directly derived














￿ = 1; (28)
from which it becomes clear that the expected risk premium implicit in asset prices must be equal





= 0; which is consistent with
(28). Moreover, the relevant UIP condition derived from the FOCs of the consumers in the RoMU
and corresponding to (26) is:




















To relate the current account balance with the trade balance, we assume that the home govern-
ment has a balanced budget policy so that we can replace the GBC (9) into the active CBC (see (41)
in Appendix A). Following Appendix A, we subtract each country￿ s GBC from each country￿ s ac-
tive CBC to obtain three bilateral NFAs equations. In Appendix A, assuming that the conditional












































; we ultimately obtain the NFAs equations (65), (67)
11and (68), respectively, where we used equation (62) for the domestic nominal bene￿ts Bh;t; which
the consumers get from their entrepreneurial activities and similarly for the RoMU and the RoW
we used foreign bene￿ts (63) and (64).17
In Appendix B, the log-linearization is worked out for the above-mentioned NFAs equations,
where the ￿nal form directly results from substitution of (134) and (135) for tradable ￿nal and
intermediate goods, respectively.
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where the term between square brackets can be approximated by b
U(R)
W;t+1 ￿ log







so that (29) becomes the familiar UIP condition:






Designing monetary policy rules concerns the choice of (a) the monetary policy instruments, (b)
the variables which are targeted and (c) their targeted values. The most important variables that
are targeted by a central bank (CB) in the literature are: (1) real output (gap), (2) (change in)
prices, (3) (change in) wages, (4) (change in) exchange rates, (5) change in interest rates, (6) a
combination of real output and prices in the form of nominal GDP.
Kydland and Prescott (1977) claim that monetary policy e⁄ectiveness depends not only on
policy actions undertaken but also on the public perception about these actions and its expectations
about future actions. Consequently, policy is more e⁄ective when future actions are predictable
so that a monetary authority can commit itself to a certain course of policies. As Atoian et al.
(2004) argue, commitment permits the CB to distribute ￿ policy medicine￿over time. For example,
when the CB wishes to o⁄set in￿ ation that will result from a supply shock, under commitment, it
can raise interest rates moderately provided that it maintains higher rates for a period of time. In
contrast, in the case of lack of commitment, a higher initial rate increase will be necessary because
of the public doubts that the CB will sustain this interest rate increase. Atoian et al. (2004)
also argue that optimal commitment does not need to take the form of a reaction function with
￿xed coe¢ cients. In general, an optimal commitment rule has the form of a state-contingent plan
that presents the instrument setting as a function of the history of exogenous shocks. However,
optimal commitment is not practical because, ￿rst, as noted by Woodford (2003), it is not feasible
to provide an advance listing of all relevant contingencies and, second, it is di¢ cult for the public
to distinguish between discretion and a complicated contingency rule. Both problems are avoided
when the CB commits to a rule with ￿xed coe¢ cients.
Which form should such a rule with ￿xed coe¢ cients take? Most CBs use the short-term
nominal interest rate as their control variable, depending on economic conditions. The most
famous and widely used examples of interest rate rules are those proposed by John Taylor. The
log-linearized standard Taylor rule (see Taylor (1993)) relates the interest rate to in￿ ation and
(logarithmic) output gap:
17Notice that Bh;t;BU;t and BW;t include bene￿ts from all the six sectors of the corresponding economies m =
FT;FN;V T;V N;MF;MV:
12rt;t+1 = #0 + #1￿t + #2yt; (31)
where ￿t and yt are annualized in￿ ation and (logarithmic) deviations of output w.r.t its steady
state value, which are assumed to be the target variables of a monetary authority. Taylor (1993)
assigns coe¢ cient values consistent with an accurate description of Federal Reserve policy for




j=0￿t￿j) as #1 = 1.5 and
#2 = 0.5. The intuition for the value of the former reaction parameter is that the CB must raise
the interest rate by more than any increase in in￿ ation in order to raise the real rate of interest,
cool the economy, and move in￿ ation back toward its target.
We review some simple deviations from the original Taylor rule studied in the literature, more
in detail in Plasmans et al. (2006b). In this paper, we consider an institutional setting in which
the home country and the RoMU already agreed in a common monetary policy rule. Therefore,
the common CB is going to set the nominal interest rate taking weighted aggregates into account





n2 is the relative weight of the RoMU in the MU. Moreover, considering the two-
level production functions (10)-(11) and (12) of our model, it is assumed that the CB targets only
the ￿nal goods deviations from the steady state production. Since a CB is in general primarily
interested in targeting CPI in￿ ation, that is in￿ ation of ￿nal goods production, we do not consider
outputs of intermediate goods in the proposed monetary policy rules.18
Therefore, we consider the following monetary policy rules extended to an MU setting:
(I) The Henderson-McKibbin and Taylor (HMT) rule for the MU, which is a direct
extension of the standard Taylor rule (31) for a setup with weighted tradable and non-tradable

























































h are the logarithmic deviations of domestic outputs of tradable and non-tradable
￿nal goods from their steady state values. Since only ￿nal goods are considered, it is expected
that the sum of the values #I
2;U and #I
3;U is (much) smaller than 0.5 (as found by Taylor (1993)).

























































4;Urt￿1;t + "2t; (33)
where #II
4 > 0 is a smoothing parameter.
18In order to have an idea of the importance of intermediate goods production, we observe from empirical input-
output tables that intermediate goods account for a large share (in some industries more than 50%) of the inputs
utilized in the ￿nal (industry) outputs.















































































t￿j is the annualized wage in￿ ation.19
The RoW￿ s CB is committed to similar Taylor-type rules as speci￿ed in (32), (33) and (34) with
the instrument being the rW
t depending on its country variables such as in￿ ation, wage in￿ ations
and tradable and non-tradable output gaps.
Mc Callum (1997) argues that the policymakers￿reaction is more accurate if it is based on
lagged and not on current values of output and in￿ ation. In response, Taylor (1999) suggests an
alternative form of his rules where lagged values of output and in￿ ation replace the current values
in (33). In contrast, Clarida et al. (1998) and others argue that rules in which the CB reacts to
forward looking variables are optimal in the case of a quadratic objective function for the monetary
authorities, which will be also utilized in this paper. The di⁄erence between backward-looking,
contermporaneous and forward-looking monetary rules relates primarily to the information set
of the monetary policymakers. For instance, in the case of a contemporaneous rule the actual
in￿ ation rate, on which the CB is assumed to have adequate information, is targeted.
10 Social welfare maximizing monetary policy rules
As already mentioned in the previous section, we focus now on those policy rules supported by the
CB that maximize welfare. Ortega and Rebei (2006) look for that Taylor rule parameterization
which maximizes the unconditional expectation of households￿lifetime utility.20 Unconditional












Ortega and Rebei (2006) compute this maximum using a grid-search algorithm of the utility
function. The model is solved for a number of parameter combinations #1, #2, #3, for di⁄erent
values of #4 and #5 , while holding constant the estimated degree of inertia in the setup of the
interest rate. Computed levels of welfare constitute a grid with the step in parameters of size 0.2.
The optimal monetary policy is the one which maximizes the individual￿ s utility after evaluation
of all points in the grid.
Following Ortega and Rebei (2006), we measure the welfare gain associated with a particular
monetary policy in terms of its compensating variation. That is, we calculate the percentage of
lifetime consumption that should be added to that obtained under the estimated Taylor rule in
19The reader could wonder why the CB would target also wage in￿ ation if it already targets in￿ ation. Concern
about wage in￿ ation could result for various reasons, among which: (i) wage in￿ ation could lead to a wage-price
spiral and (ii) it could target real wages, e.g. to secure competitiveness and contain demand-pull in￿ ation it could
try to keep real wages low.
20Welfare implications are robust to both de￿nitions of welfare, conditional and unconditional, but the uncondi-
tional welfare gain is higher than the conditional one. The conditional welfare measure is found solving the Ramsey
problem as e.g. in Levin et al. (2005). The Ramsey problem consists of the maximization of the consumer￿ s utility,
made by a benevolent planner subject to the structural model.
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where U0(U00) is the ￿rst (second) order derivative of the utility function evaluated at the steady
state and hats mean a deviation from the deterministic steady state.
















































































Following Ortega and Rebei (2006) we check variations of the Taylor rule, which assures de-
terminacy in the system. The compensating variation can be decomposed in two e⁄ects, namely
a ￿rst level e⁄ect and a second level e⁄ect. The ￿rst level is de￿ned as the amount of consump-
tion necessary to compensate the consumer since the monetary policy parameterization has been
changed, in order to reach the same level of utility, which the consumer reached under the optimal
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To get the approximated welfare gain, both e⁄ects can be added, i.e.:
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Intuitively, the welfare gain computed can be divided in two e⁄ects that work di⁄erently. The
￿rst level concerns the mean utility level required by the equivalence compensation, while the
second level concerns the volatility of the consumption. Therefore, a policy that produces a higher
15level of utility but at the expense of a higher volatility in consumption may be discouraged by the
CB.
Alternatively, Levin et al. (2005) estimate an historical monetary policy rule for the US and look
for the welfare maximizing monetary policy rule under commitment. They construct a Lagrangian
with the structural model as a set of constraints to the welfare function.21
11 Numerical simulations
In the simulations, we use the numerical parameters presented in Table 1 of Appendix G. Since
we aim to re￿ ect The Netherlands, the Rest of the EMU and the USA (as the RoW) and it is clear
from Appendix F that the data included in our sample is quarterly from 1970II to 2005IV, we try
to approximate the relative weights occurring in the EMU-wide variables of the monetary policy
rules (32), (33) and (34) from this time series data. Since the relative weights are computed in
Euros and no exchange rate data is available before 1979, 22 these relative weights are computed
for the (sub)sample period 1979I-2005IV and presented in Figure 16 of Appendix F, from which it
is evident that these weights are relatively constant over time. Hence, the average relative weights
are good approximations to the e⁄ective relative weights. Therefore, n1 is evaluated at 0:026 and
n2 at 0:3807.
In this paper, the parameterization introduces two layers of asymmetry. First, the economies
di⁄er in size, i.e. the home economy is assumed to be 2:6 % of the world, the RoMU 38:07 %,
whereas the RoW accounts for 59:33 %. Second, economies are slightly asymmetric in terms of
the structure (in the assets market). The most obvious and important asymmetries are caused
by the fact that the home economy and the RoMU create an MU; hence, they experience both
a common monetary policy and a common exchange rate. Second, we took into account more
sclerotic characteristics of the European economy assuming that the RoW (the USA) features
faster adjustment of prices and wages (lower relevant Calvo parameters in Table 1).
In the above setting we consider various shocks: common and asymmetric positive technological
shocks in the tradable ￿nal and intermediate goods sectors in di⁄erent economies, an exchange rate
shock, a monetary policy shock and a preference shock to consumption, which will be explained
in the following subsections. All the ￿gures are gathered in Appendix E.
11.1 Technological shocks
11.1.1 Technological shock to tradable ￿nal goods sector
First, we consider a positive technological shock in the production sector of tradable ￿nal goods
hitting (1a) all three economies at the same time, (1b) only the small (open) economy, (1c) only
the RoMU and (1d) only the RoW. Figures 1-3 show the adjustment of the main variables for all
these shocks.23
Common shock (1a) has by far the biggest impact on aggregate consumption (see Figure 1)
and most of other variables considered. This e⁄ect is expected, as the production capabilities
of tradable ￿nal goods grow in every economy, increasing their consumption all over the world
21In the very near future, we would like to compare both approaches in an empirical setting using the Dynare
software (see Juillard (2005)).
22Monthly exchange rate data is published on the Fed webside: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/EXUSEU?&cid=15.
23For a similar productivity shock in the setting with non-tradable goods but without intermediate goods, see
Selaive and Tuesta (2006).
16via export channels (consumption disaggregated into tradable and non-tradable components is
shown on Figure 1). Obviously, CPI in￿ ation is negative in every economy (Figure 1). What is
interesting (and common for all positive technological shocks in the production of tradable ￿nal
goods (1a-1d)), is that increased consumption of tradable goods raises (of course, to a lesser extent)
consumption of non-tradable goods in both MU economies. This indicates that the substitution
e⁄ect is lower than the income and habit formation e⁄ects (in total consumption), which does
not occur in the RoW. Figure 2 presents output, labor and wage in￿ ation in all ￿nal production
sectors. As expected, production of tradable ￿nal goods increases, employment decreases and wage
in￿ ation is negative.
In spite of the symmetric shock, asymmetric economies (in terms of size and partially in terms
of structure) react di⁄erently, mainly due to di⁄erent reactions of both CBs, which drive the
exchange rate via the UIP condition out of equilibrium (Figure 3). Both monetary policies are
expansionary (loosening) and rather similar.
Considering shocks (1b-1d), it is clear that asymmetric shocks, hitting only one country at a
time, have considerably lower impact on the economic systems than the common shock. The main
￿nding is that the economy of the RoW is more in￿ uenced by the asymmetric technological shock
that hits its FT sector than economies of the MU. As expected, the union is a net lender when
one of its countries is hit by a positive technological shock and it is a net borrower when the RoW
is hit by such a shock.
11.1.2 Technological shock to intermediate goods sectors
Second, we consider a positive technological shock either in the production of tradable intermediate
goods (shock (1e)) or non-tradable intermediate goods (shock (1f)) of the home country. Lower
prices of tradable intermediate inputs caused by shock (1e) decrease marginal costs and prices
in both tradable and non-tradable ￿nal goods sectors so that output is cheaper and increased.
Negative in￿ ation leads to loosening of monetary policies as in the technological shock to ￿nal
goods sectors in the previous subsection. After initial appreciation the exchange rate depreciates,
which makes the MU goods to be more competitive in the RoW inducing export at the expense of
domestic tradable consumption. This explains the increase in consumption of tradable ￿nal goods
abroad and counterpart decrease in the MU. Depreciation of the MU currency has additional e⁄ect
on domestic consumers who become net borrowers in spite of increasing export.
As expected, the e⁄ects of the shock to domestic non-tradable intermediate goods are the
largest in the home country. As it is assumed that non-tradable intermediate goods account for
one half of input demand, the shock in the V N sector has a bigger impact on ￿nal goods production
in both FT and FN. In these ￿nal goods producing sectors labor is substituted by now relatively
cheaper intermediate inputs (as for example capital stock).
11.2 Exchange rate shock
The exchange rate shock is modeled as a transitory appreciation of the MU currency. At the very
beginning the MU currency appreciates by 4% and the persistence of the shock is 0:85. Relevant
IRFs are presented in Figures 7-9.
The ￿rst observation is that both countries of the MU react in a similar way, which, in turn,
is opposite to the reactions of the RoW variables. From Figure 7, we conclude that an increase
in relative competitiveness of foreign (RoW) goods w.r.t. the MU has the following consequences:
consumption of tradable ￿nal goods grows in both countries of an MU, whereas it decreases in the
17RoW, making the aggregate quantities of consumption to increase and decrease, respectively. This
movement, in turn, increases non-tradable consumption due to the income and habit formation
e⁄ects, which, apparently, are stronger than the substitution e⁄ect. The increased export of the
RoW makes MU consumers to become net borrowers (negative NFAs positions).
Figure 8 presents the production side of the economy. As expected, decreased competitiveness
results in a lower production of tradable ￿nal goods in the MU and a higher one in the RoW. The
other variables also react in a way analogous to the consumption side of the economy. The above
results are comparable to those obtained by Erceg et al. (2005).
We observe very interesting e⁄ects in the adjustment of labor. In spite of the fact that there
is an increased demand and production of non-tradable ￿nal goods, the employment in this sec-
tor decreases (in the home country and the RoMU). That means that labor input for increased
production was substituted by cheaper intermediate goods imported from the RoW.
The exchange rate adjustment and monetary policies are depicted in Figure 9. The CB of the
union pursues expansionary (loosening) monetary policy to stimulate initially decreased output,
whereas the RoW￿ s CB restricts monetary policy in order to suppress in￿ ation.
In the case of this exchange rate shock, we demonstrate the in￿ uence of the presence of tradable
intermediate goods on the behavior of the model. As it was mentioned in the introduction, Dellas
(2005) points out that the presence of intermediate goods has vital consequences for the ability
of monetary authorities to manipulate nominal exchange rates. When there is no production
interdependence between countries (i.e. only consumption goods are traded) changes in a nominal
exchange rate do not a⁄ect production costs. However, when there is trade in intermediate goods
as in the real world, an exchange rate depreciation has adverse direct e⁄ects on the cost of domestic
production. Consequently, it makes the exchange rate instrument less useful.24
To verify whether it is also the case here, we construct a second version of our model, where
no tradable intermediate goods are present. More in detail, to make both versions as similar
as possible, we do not erase the V T sector completely but we assume that intermediate goods
produced in this sector do not cross the border, but are used in the production of ￿nal goods in
the domestic country. We also keep intermediate goods import sectors as such, but their role now
is not to import foreign intermediate goods, but to rebrand and repackage domestic intermediate
goods. In such a way, we obtain the version of the model which can be directly compared to the
original one. Additionally, also NFAs equations must be changed accordingly, as there is no more
trade in intermediate goods. However, this e⁄ect was not taken into account in the reasoning of
Dellas (2005), because imperfect risk sharing was out of his consideration. Without imperfect risk
sharing, indeed, we can expect that the presence of trade in intermediate goods is going to reduce
the response of the economy to an exchange rate shock. However, with imperfect risk sharing, no
trade in intermediate goods implies a lower deviation of NFAs (see Figure 7), which should lead to
a faster stabilization of the economy. Consequently, imperfect risk sharing can have a substantial
in￿ uence.
Dashed lines in Figures 7-9 present the relevant adjustments of the second version of the model.
Indeed, for most variables the model without trade in intermediate goods seems to be adjusting
slower than the standard model, which con￿rms the point of Dellas (2005).
24See Huang and Liu (2005) for a very good discussion of this issue.
1811.3 Policy shock
In the next step, we consider a (negative) shock to the interest rate of the CB of the MU. More
in detail, we simulate the loosening of MU (monetary) policy for the three Taylor-type rules
considered: (32) (Rule (I)), (33) (Rule (II)) and (34) (Rule (III)). We assume compatibility between
policies of both CBs in our model, i.e. in the case when the MU CB follows the ￿rst rule, the
RoW￿ s CB also follows the same rule.25
The general observation is that Rules (II) and (III) with interest rate smoothing (and, therefore,
with a higher persistence after the shock) have a lower impact on the economic system. Moreover,
Rule (III) leads to lower deviations from the equilibrium after the shock, which indicates that taking
account of wage in￿ ation acts countercyclically and may reduce the instability of the economy.
Expansionary monetary policy of the MU￿ s monetary authority results in increased consump-
tion in the whole MU, which induces in￿ ation, output, employment and wage in￿ ation (Figures
10 and 11). Increased output and in￿ ation make an initially expansionary policy to change into a
restrictive one after a while.
11.4 A preference shock to consumption
Next, we consider a preference shift shock which changes the relative value of consumption w.r.t.
labor by increasing the consumers￿marginal utility of consumption. In Figures 13-15 we present
and compare two shocks: (4a) hits consumers of the home country whereas (4b) hits consumers
of the RoMU. Their e⁄ects are comparable to a demand shock.26 In the case of the ￿rst shock,
consumption in the home country grows and this higher demand induces in￿ ation. Moreover, since
domestic consumers have lower incentives to work we observe wage in￿ ation, which aims to bring
a decreased employment to the initial level. The increased demand in the home country is not
matched by domestic ￿rms (except for the non-tradable sector), but primarily by RoMU￿ s ￿rms
which increase export to the market where prices become higher due to in￿ ation. This leads even
to a temporary decrease in the RoMU￿ s consumption. To suppress in￿ ation in both MU countries,
the CB pursues a restrictive monetary policy.
12 Econometric estimations
The model is estimated with an institutional setup that considers a small open economy being
a member of the EMU (The Netherlands), the rest of the EMU and the RoW (proxied by the
USA in our case). The data series included in our sample are quarterly data on real private
consumption, CPI in￿ ation, wage in￿ ation, nominal short run interest rate, tradable and non-
tradable intermediate goods running from 1970II to 2005IV (see Appendix F). To get an idea
of the statistical properties (the degree of integration) of the sample variables, especially those
variables occurring in the monetary policy rules (32), (33) and (34), we performed augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests. As put forward in Section 11, the relative weights in the EMU-wide variables
in these monetary policy rules are presented in Figure 16 of Appendix F and good approximations
to the relative weights are 0:026 for n1and 0:3807 for n2, respectively. Applying augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests, we ￿nd that, except for the EMU wage in￿ ation, all other EMU-wide variables are
25Our results can be compared to those obtained by Ortega and Rebei (2006, p. 44) for a local (domestic) nominal
interest rate shock.
26In fact, our results of the (4b) shock on the home country can be compared to those obtained by Erceg et al.
(2005) for the foreign demand shock.
19found to be integrated of order 1 at the 5% signi￿cance level.27 We estimate single equation
monetary policy rules (32), (33) and (34) using OLS in order to obtain preliminary values of the
ECB reaction parameters in setting the nominal EMU interest rate.28 This is useful for giving
support and setting monetary policy parameter bounds that govern prior densities to be assumed
in the simultaneous equations system Bayesian estimation (see further in this section). Our single-
equation estimated rules are as follows:
(i) Rule (I), i.e. monetary policy rule (32), using detrended data and in ￿rst and fourth
di⁄erences (for nominal short-term interest rates and annualized in￿ ation rates, on the one hand,
and outputs, on the other hand) to get rid of possible seasonal integration, yields:






























2 = 0:65 (35)
and

































2 = 0:265: (36)
(ii) Rule (II) (33) is the above Taylor rule with smoothing, yielding:

































2 = 0:83 (37)
and


































2 = 0:37: (38)
(iii) Rule (III) is estimated with total EMU wage in￿ ation, since both the tradable and non-
tradable EMU wage in￿ ation rates are treated as unobserved variables. Using detrended series
and appropriately di⁄erenced series to estimate (34), we ￿nd:










































2 = 0:83 (39)
27In the EMU series in levels, the null of the unit root cannot be rejected: (i) EMU interest rate (with p-value of
0.27); (ii) MU annualized in￿ ation (with 0.33 of prob.); EMU output (with 0.8 of prob.). EMU wage in￿ ation is at
the edge (with 0.05 of prob.). All the series become stationary after taking ￿rst di⁄erences.
Alternatively, we checked stationarity properties of the detrended part of all the series (using the standard
Hoddrick-Prescott ￿lter with ￿ = 1600) and we found that the cyclical part is always stationary.
Stationarity results for the RoW (USA) series are similar to those of the EMU.
28The evidence shown in the previous footnote suggests that, in order to estimate monetary rules using OLS, we
must use either data in di⁄erences or the detrended part. We performed both possibilities.
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2 = 0:37: (40)
Similar equations are derived for the nominal short-term interest rate of the Federal Reserve
Bank (Fed).
These estimators are very useful to establish the parameter bounds of the assumed prior den-
sities. Next to the arguments put forward in Section 9, the parameter values in (35), (37) and
(39) are lower than those reported in the literature, which is very probably due to the method of
￿ltering used (Hodrick Prescott).
A large number of parameters is involved in DSGE models and, particularly, in our three-
country model. Therefore, it might not be trivial to know a priori the set of model coe¢ cients
assuring the rank condition for the solution of forward-looking (jump) variables (see Blanchard
and Kahn (1980)).29
To estimate the model, it is transformed in the state space form. The set of variables can either
be observed or not: (i) observed, i.e. taken from national accounts databases and (ii) unobserved,
or the rest of the model variables. In order to compute the joint sample likelihood and get the
estimators, we use the Kalman ￿lter. The paper by Ratto et al. (2005a) discusses this method
in detail; moreover, their and our computations are performed using the DYNARE toolbox for
Matlab (see Juillard (2005)).
In Table 1 in Appendix G, we inform about prior densities of the ￿ deep￿structural parameters,
AR coe¢ cients of autocorrelated shocks and standard deviations of these shocks. Observe that
several structural parameters are ￿xed rather than attributed a prior density. Following Ortega and
Rebei (2006) and other authors, we calibrate these ￿xed parameters to those found in the literature.
When this is the case, there is no standard deviation (SD) declared between parentheses in Table
1, since it is always zero then.
In order to obtain Bayesian estimates for the whole system we formulate independent prior
densities for each of the 36 model parameters in the case of the ￿rst monetary policy rule; 38 in
the case of the second monetary rule and 40 in the case of the third monetary rule.30 The choice
of these prior densities is based on the literature mentioned in Table 1 of Appendix G. Notice that
most of these prior densities are relatively uninformative.
Overall, the posterior densities are quite sensitive to the assumed prior densities as also dis-
cussed in Onatski and Williams (2003), Smets and Wouters (2003), Lubik and Schorfheide (2005)
and Levin et al. (2005). Point estimates of the posterior means and corresponding standard errors
and of standard deviations of the shocks are conditional on the estimation methodology, the sample
(duration) and the values of calibrated (non-stochastic) parameters.
In Table 2 in Appendix G, we report estimates using the Bayesian estimation procedure. In
particular, we report estimates of the complete NOEM model taking account of the historical
monetary policy rule where the ECB and the Fed systematically smooth the nominal short-term
29Ratto et al. (2005b, p.14) check systematically for all parameters and determine which of them are more likely
to lead to indeterminacy.
30Compare to Table 6 in Levin et al. (2005), where 31 parameters are assumed to have an independent prior
density.
21interest rate (Rule (II)). Estimation results using model version with Rules (I) and (III) provide
us contradictory results and are not reported.31
Assuming that the ECB and the Fed are committed to Rule (II), the Bayesian estimation
results are reported in Table 2 in Appendix G. In general, the application illuminates on the deep
parameters, mainly of The Netherlands being the small open economy studied. Our discussion
restricts to the parameters being estimated signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The Dutch consumers￿
risk aversion parameter is estimated at 2.005, very close to the assumed prior. Furthermore, the
degree of Dutch consumer habit persistence is estimated at 0.602, which is signi￿catively large
than the prior mean of 0.5.32
We focus on rigidity parameters governing prices of ￿nal and intermediate goods and wages in
the three countries. Assuming identical prior values and densities for the NL and the RoEMU,
point estimates are quite accurate, ￿nding evidence that the NL show more stickiness in prices
than the RoEMU (on average the NL reset FT and FN prices every 2.44 quarter vs. 2.18 in the
RoEMU and 1.53 quarter in the US). Regarding VT and VN stickiness, on average in the NL
these intermediate goods sectors reset prices every 1.53 quarter, in the RoMU every 1.65 quarter,
and in the US every 1.63 quarter. These results are consistent with the common wisdom that
intermediate goods markets are more competitive than ￿nal goods markets and with a very small
disparity among countries. Finally, regarding wages, the same ordering as in ￿nal goods sectors
remains: on average the NL reset wages every 1.90 quarter, the RoEMU every 1.80 quarter and
the US each 1.56 quarter. Regarding the reaction parameters that shape monetary policy Rule
(II) for the ECB and the Fed, we ￿nd estimates of the posterior means for the CPI in￿ ation, #II
1;U
and #II
1;W, and smoothed interest rate reaction parameters, #II
4;U and #II
4;W, that are in the very
neighborhood of the prior means with (very) low standard errors.33





3;W) depart from the prior means, but show extremely (and incredibly?) low
standard errors. Moreover, the standard deviations of the shocks are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero.
13 Concluding remarks
In this paper, a New-Keynesian open economy (NOEM) model for three (regions of) countries
was constructed with a detailed treatment of the consumption and production sectors involving
tradable and non-tradable ￿nal and intermediate goods under several sources of stickiness (the
most important of which are Calvo-type nominal price and wage restrictions). More in particular,
in our setting we model a small open economy being a member of a monetary union, the rest of
that monetary union and the rest of the world. Historical monetary policy rules, derived as direct
extensions of the familiar Taylor rules, are added to the model, assuming full commitment to these
rules by the two central banks involved. More in detail, we studied three types of Taylor rules: (i)
a simple Taylor rule based on deviations of CPI in￿ ation and output from the steady state, (ii)
31Remark that, obviously, also NOEM models with di⁄erent types of monetary policy rules for the ECB and the
Fed (e.g. Rule (I) for the ECB and Rule (II) for the Fed, etc.) could be considered. Although this seems very
relevant from an empirical point of view, we do not perform this here to save space and time and leave it for future
experiments.
Results considering Rules (I) and (III) can be obtained from the authors by simple request.
32This value is somewhat smaller than the value 0.65 as assumed in Dellas (2005).
33Comparing with the OLS results in equation (37), we ￿nd a very similar reaction parameter for the smoothed
interest rate (but not for the reaction to the CPI in￿ ation).
22similar to (i) but including (nominal short-term) interest rate smoothing and (iii) similar to (ii)
but including wage in￿ ation.
A full characterization of this three-country setting is derived as a set of dynamic non-linear
equations. Then, the complete structure is log-linearized and the impacts of various types of
shocks are analyzed and simulated: (i) common and asymmetric positive technological shocks in
the tradable ￿nal (intermediate) goods sectors in di⁄erent economies, (ii) an exchange rate shock,
(iii) a monetary policy shock, and (iv) a preference shock to consumption. The impact of these
shocks is illustrated with graphs of the impulse response functions based on numerical simulations.
In most of the simulations (except for shock (iii), where we compare di⁄erent rules with each
other), we assume that both central banks follow the second type of Taylor rule.
The results of our simulations, conditioned on the assumed parameterization, can be summa-
rized as follows. A positive technological shock hitting all the economies at the same time has a
much stronger impact than similar country-speci￿c technological shocks. What is interesting, in
particular, is that both monetary policies are expansionary (loosening) after a positive technolog-
ical shock which increases outputs. This happens because output increase is o⁄set with de￿ ation.
A similar behavior of central banks is noticed after a positive technological shock in intermediate
goods sectors.
After an exchange rate shock (appreciation of a monetary union currency), the central bank
of the monetary union pursues an expansionary (loosening) monetary policy to stimulate initially
decreased output, whereas the central bank of the rest of the world restricts monetary policy in
order to suppress in￿ ation.
The general observation from the comparison of di⁄erent monetary policy rules is that rules
with interest rate smoothing (and, therefore, with a higher persistence after the shock) have a
more moderate impact on the economic system. Moreover, a rule including wage in￿ ation leads
to lower deviations from the equilibrium after the shock, which indicates that taking into account
these variables acts countercyclically and may increase stability of the economy.
In the case of this exchange rate shock, we demonstrated the in￿ uence of tradable intermediate
goods modeling on the behavior of the model. To do that, we constructed a very similar setting
with only one di⁄erence - previously tradable intermediate goods were not tradable but were used
in the production process of the origin country. Our simulations con￿rm the proposition of Dellas
(2005) that the presence of intermediate goods can have important (negative) consequences for the
ability of monetary authorities to manipulate nominal exchange rates (in our model via the UIP
condition). Our model with intermediate goods appeared to be more stable after an exchange rate
shock than the model without intermediate goods. All the simulations have passed a moderate
robustness check w.r.t. main parameters and especially w.r.t. a relative size of countries.
Further insights about the asymmetric characteristics of the model are gained from the empirical
Maximum Likelihood and Bayesian model estimations of the deep structural parameters, applied
to a quarterly panel data sample (running from 1970II to 2005IV) of the Netherlands, the rest of
the EMU and the rest of the world (proxied by the USA).
Rule (II) is the rule that yields the most consistent results. We ￿nd that the NL show more
stickiness in prices than the RoEMU and the US. For the tradable and non-tradable ￿nal goods
the prices of the NL are sticky during 2.5 quarters on the average, while these prices in the US are
sticky during one quarter less. The price stickiness in the intermediate goods sectors is about one
quarter less than in the ￿nal goods sectors and very similar among countries, but somewhat less
sticky in the NL than in the RoEMU. In setting wages, we ￿nd the same ordering as in the ￿nal
goods sectors: on average the NL reset wages every 1.90 quarter, the RoEMU every 1.80 quarter
and the US each 1.56 quarter.









 	 	 




















  	  #		
	 
 	 









  1  

$	















































   	  @5






































































































































































 	    





















































































































D:4		 ,:   	
























































































































































































































































































! 	 		  4	





,--.  	  		$













































































































		 	 			 	 
 	
  :.  9	
  	  4 			





 	$	  4
	































































































































 :C! :B  	  
 	










	!  	 	 
 	9! 	 

	  	9 















































   






































































































































































































































	 	 	 
	 
  $  			 
 







  :A!  

  	9 

 5.!  	 	 	
 	
	0


























































































































 	 	 
J
 	 	  	 			 
  	 
3! 
 	 	9 

 5D  5@  	 	 
 



















 		  		$
 :.  
	


















































  	 "%)  	 "* 	 
 










































































































 .,! .D  .@  	 37
 	9
 :D! :@  ::!  

2
  	 
 		































































































































































































































































 	 	 
J
 	 	  	 $ 












































 	   	  37
 
 !  	9! 
 	9  	 
  	 $ 
			 	 	

4!  	 "%)  	 "*0
D.	  	 	















































































































 !  	 	 ! 	 
  	
 



























































































































































 	9 .:  	 	 	


































































 2	/	   

	 	 	  	

  	 

	




 	! 	 		 	 		 $
 	 

 .2C  	 

	
































   
   	


























	   	 
 ' 
 	 
 '  		  	 

  	 		 

 	




29 	  	    C-

		 6N  
 ,--@!  
  	 
 	  	 
	 































    

%
 	  

%



















"%)  	 "* ;	
	! 	 
	 
	  	 	 37
















	 CD!  



























































































































































































































































































































	! 	   	 , 	 	 ;  ,    ,




















































 ,--.! 	 
	 






  	 "%)  	 "* 


































    
	















   
	







   	 2
 	
 




















4!  	 	 $ 
 
	! 	 
		  .C  +

  
 ,--.  	 
	
































 !   














































































































































































	    
	
  B,
		 	 Y 
 	 	 	$	 		 2































































































 	   	 	 
  	 ! 	 /
 		
	
 	   	 	 %) 
	  
 	 
 	 	 	























 	  	 	 	 	$ C:  $ 
!  	
  	 		
  




  	=  $ 























 	   	 
	 

























  ! 
 






























































































































































































































































  	 
	







   






































































 15  
















  	 2
 	
  	 			 
 
	 "%)  	 "* 






























































 		  

    
 		
























    
 	




















   
 	

     
 		
     
 	

 	 	  


  	 	 2

 	
  	 			 
  	 	 











 %		! 	 


















 	 			 
 
	 	 
































































































































  		 
	 	  			 
!   







 	 		 2
  			 
! 	 	0
Y

















































































































































































	 	 2	/	  C.  ,	









































  	 		
  
 	! 	 
	 	9










 	 		 
  










































































 	  	 
	 
	  	   4 







































































































































































	  	  



































	  5-, 




































































	 	 	  	 
	   
	
( 




,--.  	  
  
 
 5-  







































































   ! 	 




 CA  	 	




















































































	 	 	 	 
	



















































































































































































   5-A
		 	 
















































































































































































 	  

































































  ! 55:






























































   55C
	 	
































































































































































































































































































































 	 		   

  	 	
22	























































































































































































































































































































! 	 	 	  		 	 
	 
	 




















 	 	 /
 %
















































































































	 BB  	
22	 B: %		0



































































































































































    5,,
 	 	 >
	&
   5,D
4 	
 
 	 	  	 	
	






































    5,C
 	 	 >
	 &






































    5D,
 	 	 >
	 &
   5DD
)
 	 	 
 	 
 		  






   	
 	  
	
   
	
















   	
 	  
	
   
	







































 	  	 "*
;! 7
 
   


   8
*	 
 		 	
  			 
  	 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 	 	 
	 
	 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
 		






















   	 
*	  	  	 	
  	  	




	 	 & 	




























 	  
   
  
























	  	 
	








 	  2	 $ 



















  	  	

 	  2	 			
    
 	   	  !	









    !

 	  

 	 
   











 	 		  	 
	
































































































































  V 
   












  	 
7  	9
 	  5DB  2	/   
	 
	! 		  
 	  
 	  
 
 	 ! 	    	   	  
+
	
  	 
	 
	  	9 

 	 	  
	  	9
! 












	 		 	  	 	
		  
 7	 
  2	/	 	
  	 (% 	  		
	
	
   	  			   	
	   
 
	0 	 
   














	 	  	















	  	! 	 	
	 	 2	/	 	9






 	  
	 	9	
  	 

 0
  :   	
 :	
   

 :	
   	
 :	






   ?    :   	
  	
 ?	
   	
  	
 :	













   	
  	
 ?	
   	
  	
 :	
































































































































 	 3( 0
       9
    9








































       9
    9









   5@B
: 

       9
    9










   5@A
: 

       9
    9









   5:-
: 

       9
    9










   5:5

















       9
    9










  $ 
  	 	  $ 	 0
  7	
  +	'	  +	"	:	




















  			 
0
  7	









































































   	 
	



































































































































	 	 	9 

0







    	
 7	


















    	
 7	

















































  +	 
+	 
7	















































































































































































































































































































  			 






































































(   
	
















































































(   
	
  	  
	









































(   
	


















































































































































































(   
	
  	  
	

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  	  
	
 	
	 	  
	





























































































(1e) Shock to VT1
(1f) Shock to VNT1
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(2a) With VT sector
(2b) Without VT sector
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A verage 1979-2005: N L 2.6% ; N L+R oEM U  38.07% ; and U S (R oW ) 61.93
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